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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC 8230-81
16 December 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Acting Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: Charles E. Waterman
National Intelligence Officer for NESA

SUBJECT: Golan Situation

1. Attached are up-to-date analyses by NFAC/NESA on the Golan situation. 25X1
2. There is no indication of imminent hostilities erupting as a result of the Golan annexation, despite apparent Israeli contingency moves. An outbreak of fighting in Lebanon cannot be ruled out, however. 25X1

3. The longer-term regional effects of the Israeli action, other than the obvious territorial/security enhancement, are the following:

- It renders pursual by moderate Arab states or Western powers of compromise solutions involving territorial return such as the "Fahd plan" almost impossible. The Syrians, as they demonstrated at Fez, must be a party to any such solution or they will sabotage it. Arafat has now associated himself publicly and privately with the Fahd plan, and the Saudis were intending to cajole Syria to drop its adamancy. The Israeli move will dissipate these efforts, as peculiarly Syrian concerns can no longer be realistically addressed.
- It further tends to alienate moderate Arabs from the United States, no matter what occurs at the United Nations Security Council.

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
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-- It puts Egypt "on-the-spot" either to mute its criticism of Israel's annexation, or to risk endangering the April return of the remainder of the Sinai.

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Charles E. Waterman

Attachment:
Analyses on Golan Situation

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